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the Court." The order 's objections 
made, and the 
thereto shall 
or his counsel, 
them to be 
such '' Corrections 
rections 
and the cor-
have been actually made, 
the corrected reporter's tran-
Such peremptory writ of mandate shall also direct respond-
ent court to transmit to the governor of California complete, 
authenticated copies of the clerk's and reporter's transcripts 
of the resettlement proceedings. 
This order is final forthwith. 
Gibson, C. J., Shenk, J., Traynor, 
Comb, J., concurred. 
Carter, J., concurred in the order. 
Spence, ,J., and Me-
F. No. 19635. In Bank. Oct. 14, 1958.] 
CALIFORNIA GASOLINE RETAILERS (a Nonprofit Cor-
poration) et al., Respondents, v. REGAL PETROLEUM 
CORPORATION OF PRESNO, INC. (a Corporation) 
et al., Appellants. 
[1] Lotteries-Constitutional Provision.-Const., art. IV, § 26, de-
claring that the Legislature shall have no power to authorize 
lotteries or gift enterprises for any purpose and shall pass 
laws to prohibit the sale of or gift enterprise tickets 
or tickets in any scheme in the nature of a lottery, shows a 
legislative intention that lotteries are to be prohibited, but is 
not a "self-enforcing" or "self-executing" provision. 
[2] Parties- Suing on Behalf of All.-Code Civ. Proc., § 382, 
authorizing or class suits, is based on the doc-
[1] See Cal.Jur.2d, Lotteries, § 2; Am.Jur., Lotteries, § 19 et seq. 
[2] See Cal.Jur.2d, § 22 et seq.; Am.Jur., Parties, § 44 
et seq. 
McK. Dig. References: Lotteries, § 1; [2-4] Parties, § 10; [5] 
Pleading, § 192; [6] Pleading, § 185(7); [7] Pleading, § 175(1); 
[8] Pleading, § 200; 16, Lotteries, § 3; [15] Statutes, 
§ 118. 
Oct. 
trine of virtual representation and 
era] rule of all mt;erest;eu. 
codification theory of convenience to 
represent the rights of others 
similarly situated who could be in the controversy. 
[3] !d.-Suing on Behalf of AlL-To authorize a class proceeding 
there must be a well-defined of interest in the 
questions of law and fact involved the parties to 
be represented. 
[4] !d.-Suing on Behalf of All.-A having 
members in the stations in a 
certain area was not a proper plaintiff in a representa-
tive or class suit to enjoin an lottery by three 
groups of independent service station operators, where there 
was no community of interest between plaintiff and its mem-
bers and they were not "similarly situated" in view of the fact 
that plaintiff was complaining of inability of its members to 
pay dues and assessments, while the members were alleged to 
have been injured by defendants through loss of business. 
[5] Pleading- Amendment- Inserting Names of Parties.-The 
amendment of a complaint filed by a nonprofit corporation 
to include an individual member of the corporation as a party 
plaintiff had the effect of curing the original pleading naming 
the corporation as party plaintiff, which was defective in that 
the corporation was not authorized to bring the action in a 
representative capacity in behalf of its members, who were en-
gaged in the operation of gasoline stations in a certain area, 
where the individual named in the amendment was a member 
of the corporation and therefore "similarly situated" with 
the other members. 
[6] !d.-Amendment-After Submission of Case.-A court may, 
in its discretion, permit amendment of the pleadings after 
the evidence is in, pending argument of counsel, and even after 
submission of the cause. 
[7] !d.-Amendment-Liberality in Exercise of Power.-Thc statu-
tory provision relating to amendments of pleadings in further-
ance of justice (Code Civ. Proc., § 473) is liberally construed. 
[8] !d.-Amendment-To Conform to Proof.-It was not an abuse 
of discretion to permit the amendment of a complaint im-
properly naming a nonprofit corporation as party plaintiff to 
include an individual (the president and a member of the cor-
poration) as plaintiff so th~ the pleadings would conform to 
[9] Scheme for advertising or stimulating legitimate business as 
a lottery, notes, 48 A.L.R. 1115; 57 A.L.R. 424; 103 A.L.R. 866; 
109 A.L.R. 709; 113 A.L.R. 1121. See also Cal.Jur.2d, Lotteries, 
§ 5; Am.Jur., Lotteries,§ 3. 
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the proof, where the amendment stated no new cause of action 
against defendants, did not state any new facts, and defend-
ants were not prejudiced thereby. 
[9] Lotteries-Elements.-Three elements must be present to con-
stitute a lottery, namely, a prize, distribution by chance, and 
consideration. 
[10] Id.-Elements-Consideration.-An essential element of a 
lottery is that a prize determined by chance be distributed 
to a person who has paid a valuable consideration for the 
chance of winning a prize, that is, one who has hazarded some-
thing of value on the chance. 
[11] Id. - Elements - Consideration.-A "closed participation 
scheme" is where those participating in the scheme have paid 
a consideration for a chance to win the prize, while a "flexible 
participation" type is where some have paid a consideration 
and some have not. 
[12] !d.-Elements-Consideration.-Where it clearly appears that 
any person could have received a ticket or tickets free for the 
asking or without a request and without the necessity of mak-
ing any kind of purchase, the relative numbers of tickets dis-
tributed with and without purchases should not be determina-
tive of the issue whether the holders of tickets paid or promised 
to pay a valuable consideration for the chance of winning a 
prize. 
[13] Id.-Elements-Consideration.-The question of whether con-
sideration has been paid for the chance of winning a prize is 
not to be determined from the standpoint of the party dis-
tributing the prize tickets, but from that of the holders of the 
tickets. 
[14] Id.-Elements-Consideration.-In view of Pen. Code, § 319, 
defining a lottery and providing that the consideration neces-
sary is a "valuable one" paid or promised to be paid by the one 
receiving the ticket, the fact that a ticket holder must go to 
the place of business of the sponsor of the scheme to deposit 
the ticket stub cannot be considered the necessary considera-
tion. 
[15] Statutes-Construction-Penal Statutes.-Penal statutes will 
not be given application beyond their plain intent; they include 
only those offenses coming clearly within the import of the 
language. 
[16] Lotteries- Elements- Consideration.-In determining the 
consideration necessary to ~nstitute a promotion scheme a 
lottery within the purview of Pen. Code, § 319, the definition 
of consideration as found in Civ. Code, § 1605, will not be 
accepted. 
[17] Id.-What Constitutes a Lottery.-An advertising and pro-
motional scheme operated by three groups of independent ser-
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vice station operators the members of which distributed tickets 
for drawings for prizes did not fall within the definition of a 
lottery as set forth in Pen. Code, § 319, because of lack of 
consideration, where in all three groups prize tickets were 
given free to anyone who asked for them and to many who did 
not ask for them, the tickets were given to persons away from 
the service stations, the receipt of the tickets was not depend-
ent on purchase of merchandise or service, and the prize win-
ning tickets were honored regardless of whether or not mer-
chandise was purchased. 
APPEAL from portions of a judgment of the Superior 
Court of Fresno County. George M. DeWolf, Judge. Re-
versed. 
Action to enjoin service station operators from engaging in 
a give-away program alleged to constitute a lottery. Portions 
of judgment for plaintiffs, reversed . 
.A. E. Stebbings, C. Neil Ash, James D. Garibaldi, Frank 
C. Lerrigo, Eckhart A. Thompson, Martin J. Weil, Brewster 
L. Arms, Robert R. Rosson and A. Hugo Pearson for Ap-
pellants. 
Eugene S. Clifford, Caspar \V. Weinberger, Heller, Ehrman, 
White & McAuliffe, Philip C. Wilkins, Spencer E. Van Dyke, 
Smith, Van Dyke & Hildreth, David F. Crossen and Thomas 
B. Curtis as Amici Curiae on behalf of Appellants. 
Rowell, Lamberson & Thomas, Milo E. Rowell, Richard Z. 
Lamberson and Breekinridgc Thomas for Respondents. 
Edmund G. Brown, Attorney General, Clarence A. Linn, 
Assistant Attorney General, and Victor Griffith, Deputy At-
torney General, as Amici Curiae on behalf of Respondents. 
CARTER, J.-The original plaintiff in this action for 
injunctive relief was California Gasoline Retail0rs, a non-
profit California corporation consisting of members distrib-
uting the products of the major oil companies, Standanl Oil, 
Shell Oil, Union Oil and others. The defendants, too numer-
ous to name individually, are members of three groups of 
independ(•nt service station operators. For convenience, they 
have been, and will be, referred to as the Regal Group, the 
Norwalk Group and the Beacon Group. 
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some 60 of whose members were in the Fresno 
area where this case arose, suit the defend-
ants charging them with away their products in viola-
tion of the Unfair Trade Practices Act (Bus. & Prof. Code, 
17000-17101) with fraudulent and misleading advertising; 
and with a in violation of sections 320, 321 
and :322 of the Penal Code. The trial court found in favor 
of defendants on the 
parties had 
file an amendment to the 
Hudson as a party 
tiff corporation and one of 
was denied with the court 
unfair trade 
but in favor of the 
them with conducting 
had been conrluded and both 
made a motion for leave to 
and to add one Philip M. 
Hudson was p1'esident of plain-
its members. Plaintiff's motion 
ruling if it could be done without 
ants. On the day the decision was 
plaintiff's motion to amend. 
the right to alter its 
prejudice to the defend-
the court granted 
All defendants appeal, contending that ( 1) the plaintiff 
corporation -vvas not a proper party plaintiff; (2) the court 
abused its discretion in permitting the amendment and joinder 
of Hudson as a plaintiff; (3) their and merchan-
dising program did not constitute a lottery as defined hy sec-
tion 319 of the Penal Code; ( 4) 1vi1l not enjoin the 
commission of a crime unless the activities constitute a public 
nuisance, or direct pecuniary loss has been sustained by the 
plaintiff. 
[1] It is also contended that article IV, section 26, of the 
California Constitution evidences a strong public policy 
against lotteries in this state. That so far as is here 
pertinent, provides: ''The l;egislatnre shall have no power 
to authorize lotteries or gift for any purpose 
and shall pass laws to prohibit the sale in this State of 
lottery or gift enterprise tickets or tickets in any scheme in 
the nature of a lottery." 'While the section just quoted shows 
a legislative intention that lotteries are to be prohibited in 
this state, it is obvious from the language thereof that it is 
not a "self-enforcing" or "self-executing" provision such as 
is found in article I, section 14, of the Constitution (Rose v. 
State, 19 Cal.2d 713,720,721 []23 P.2d 305]). The language 
shows that it >vas intended that the Legislature should have 
no power to authorize lotteries hy legislation and that it was 
to enact legislation prohibiting lotteries. It is also apparent 
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from a reading of the provisions that a lottery is not defined. 
Pnrsnant to the mandate of the just-quoted section, the Legis-
lature has enacted legislation defining and prohibiting lot-
teries and these provisions are hereinafter discussed. 
PLAINTIFF CoRPORATION As PROPER PARTY PLAINTIFF;* 
JOINDER oF HunsoN As PARTY PLAINTIFF 
Plaintiff corporation is composed of members who sell gaso-
line and other related products. Some 60-odd members reside 
in Fresno County and there are others elsewhere in the state. 
Plaintiff argues that it is a proper plaintiff by virtue of 
section 382 of the Code of Civil Procedure which provides 
that ''. . . when the question is one of a common or general 
interest, of many persons, or when the parties are numerous, 
and it is impracticable to bring them all before the court, 
one or more may sue or defend for the benefit of all.'' De-
fendants contend that there was no authorization to the 
plaintiff corporation to bring the suit; that plaintiff corpora-
tion is not, itself, engaged in selling gasoline; that there are 
more defendants than plaintiffs and that it would not be 
impracticable to bring them before the court. It is true, as 
stated by defendants, that the complaint does not allege that 
plaintiff was authorized to bring the suit on behalf of its 
members. It is alleged that plaintiff's members have suffered 
loss of customers and loss of sales of gasoline and other 
products and related commodities and ''have been injured in 
their property and businesses . . . ''; that plaintiff will also 
suffer injury and loss by ''reason of the inability of said mem-
bers to pay dues and assessments and to participate as 
members of Plaintiff Corporation." 
In Haggerty v. County of Kings, 117 Cal.App.2d 470, 477 
[256 P.2d 393], the court noted: "In the present case it is 
alleged in the complaint that plaintiff is the secretary of the 
California State Federation of Labor and has been authori.sed 
to bring this action in a representative capacity; that the 
Federation and its members are engaged in peaceful picket-
ing; that the defendants have threatened to institute and are 
instituting prosecution of such pickets and members under 
the provisions of the two ordinances involved and that the 
members of the Federation constitute a class similarly situated 
with respect to the matters alleged. These allegations must 
be accepted as true where, as here, the demurrer to the com-
*This point was presented to the trial eourt by special demurrer and 
motion to dismiss. 
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plaint was sustained without leave to amend." (Emphasis 
added.) It would appear that the court in the Haggerty case 
considered an allegation as to authorization to bring the suit 
necessary as well as an allegation to the effect that the mem-
bers represented constituted a class similarly situated. There 
are no such allegations in the complaint under consideration. 
[2] It appears that the interest of plaintiff corporation and 
its members may fall within the rule of Parker v. Bowron, 
40 Cal.2d 344, 352, 353 [254 P.2d 6]: "The statutory pro-
vision [Code Civ. Proc., § 382] is based upon the doctrine 
of virtual representation and is an exception to the general 
rule of compulsory joinder of all interested parties. CW eaver 
v. Pasadena Tounwment of Roses Assn., 32 Cal.2d 833, 837 
[198 P.2d 514].) It is a codification of 'the common law 
theory of convenience to the parties when one or more fairly 
represent the rights of others similarly situated who could 
be designated in the controversy.' (Fallon v. Superior Court, 
33 Cal.App.2d 48, 50 [90 P.2d 858].) [3] '[R]egardless of 
which of the alternative conditions of the statute is invoked 
as authorizing a class proceeding, it has been uniformly held 
that there must be a well-defined "community of interest" 
in the questions of law and fact involved as affecting the 
parties to be represented.' ( W cavcr v. Pasadena T01trnarnent 
of Roses Assn., supra; Jellen v. O'Brien, 89 Cal.App. 505, 
509 [264 P. 1115].) 
"No facts have been alleged to bring Parker within this 
well established rule regarding class suits. He does not claim 
to be a member of the interested class, and there is nothing 
to indicate that he is 'similarly situated' with those whom 
he pretends to represent. There can be no 'common or general 
interest' in the subject matter of the controversy (Weaver 
v. Pasadena Tournament of Roses Assn., S1tpra, p. 842) be-
tween Parker, who is not employed by the city, and city 
employees. Parker cannot give himself standing to sue by 
purporting to represent a class of which he is not a member.'' 
[4] In other words, if the rule of Parker v. Bowron, supra, 
40 Ca1.2d 344, 352, 353, is strictly applied, there is no com-
munity of interest between plaintiff and its members and they 
are not "similarly situated" since plaintiff is complaining of 
the inability of its members to pay dues and assessments, and 
the members are alleged to have been injured by defendants 
through loss of business. It would thus appear that plaintiff 
corporation is not a proper party plaintiff. 
[5] The amendment to the complaint and the inclusion 
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of Hudson as a party plaintiff have the effect of curing the 
original defective pleading. Hudson is a member of plain-
tiff corporation and therefore "similarly situated" with the 
other members. Section 473, Code of Civil Procedure, pro-
vides that "The court may, in furtherance of justice, and 
on such terms as may be proper, allow a party to amend any 
pleading or proceeding by adding or striking out the name 
of any party .... " [6] In Feigin v. Kntchor, 105 Cal.App. 
2d 744, 747, 748 [234 P.2d 264], it was held that a court 
may, in its discretion, permit amendment of pleadings after 
the evidence is all in, pending argument of counsel, and even 
after submission of the cause. [7] The statutory provision 
relating to amendments to the pleadings in the furtherance 
of justice has received a very liberal construction in the courts 
of this state (Klopstock v. Superior Court, 17 Cal.2d 13, 19 
[108 P.2d 906, 135 A.L.R. 318]). [8] The amendment to 
the complaint stated no new cause of action against the 
defendants, nor did it state any new facts. It does not appear 
that defendants were prejudiced thereby and the court did 
not abuse its discretion in permitting the amendment and 
inclusion of Hudson as plaintiff so that the pleadings would 
conform to the proof. (Foster v. Keating, 120 Cal.App.2d 
435, 446 [261 P.2d 529] .) 
ADVERTISING AND MERCHANDISING PROGRAM As LOTTERY 
Section 319 of the Penal Code provides: ''A lottery is any 
scheme for the disposal or distribution of property by chance, 
among persons who have paid or promised to pay any valuable 
consideration for the chance of obtaining such property or a 
portion of it, or for any share or any interest in such property, 
upon any agreement, understanding, or expectation that it is 
to be distributed or disposed of by lot or chance, whether 
called a lottery, raffle, or gift-enterprise, or by whatever name 
the same may be known.'' 
[9] It is agreed by all parties that three elements must 
be present to constitute a lottery: (1) a prize; (2) distributed 
by chance ; and ( 3) consideration. All parties are also agreed 
that the first two elements are present under the facts here 
presented. It is the third element of consideration upon which 
the parties differ. 
Inasmuch as all three groups of defendants operated in 
slightly different ways, the facts concerning their operations 
will be set forth separately. 
THE HEGAI, GROUP 
The operates three service stations in Presno 
which conduct what is known as a program as 
part of a and advertising scheme. Tickets were 
distributed to the Regal stations for redistribution to the pub-
lic. They were to persons before any purchase of 
or other service, or whether any sale was made; they 
were distributed with the stubs attached from house to house; 
they were distributed at drive-in theaters and at baseball 
games. Those who received the tickets away from the stations 
were to go to one of the stations to deposit the ticket 
stub. Rules for the drawing were posted in each Hegal station 
and provided that any person over the age of 18 years would 
receive, free of charge, an officially numbered ticket; that the 
winner did not have to be present at the time of the drawing; 
and that the winning numbers would be posted for a seven-
day period at the Regal stations after the periodic drawings. 
The prizes to be won consisted of an automobile, cash and 
other personal property. 
TuE NoRwALK GROUP 
This, too, was a merchandising and advertising program 
and these defendants advertised in the newspaper, over the 
radio and by billboards that each month, commencing with 
May, 1955, the Norwalk stations would give away three Buick 
automobiles, and several household appliances. When this 
program was initiated, the distributors, to defray the expenses 
of the campaign, increased the price of gasoline to the re-
tailers by one cent per gallon which increase was passed on 
to the consumers. Those Norwalk dealers who did not choose 
to participate in the program did not receive their gasoline 
at the increased rate. The Norwalk tickets were given away 
to anyone who asked for them regardless of whether any 
product or service offered for sale was purchased ; tickets 
were also distributed from house to house, and some 5,000 
of them were placed under windshield wipers of cars parked 
at the Fresno County Fair Grounds. One of the Norwalk 
dealers testified that he gave more tickets for larger pur-
chases and that he passed along the one-cent increase in his 
cost of gasoline to the purchasers thereof. Another Norwalk 
dealer testified that he gave tickets to those driving into his 
station both before and after purchases. 'l'he ticket stubs 
were required to be deposited in a receptacle in a Norwalk 
station. There is evidence in the record that when Norwalk 
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tickets were distributed mvay from the stations, the stubs were 
first removed so that the recipient did not have to go into 
the station to be eligible for one of the prizes. A drawing 
was held once a month and the winning list was posted for 
seven days at all Norwalk stations in the pro-
gram. If no claimant to call for his during 
the seven-day the prize was then awarded to the 
winning number next in line. \Yritten rules were posted at 
each participating station and provided 1) that ''Any 
person who is 18 years of age or over will be given free, on 
request, an official numbered ticket for any dravving. Giving 
of such ticket is unconditional and does not depend on the 
purchase of or payment for any merchandise or service." 
THE BEACON GROUP 
This was a similar advertising and merchandising opera-
tion entered into by the Beacon and Camino! Company in con-
junction with United Stations, Inc., an association of gasoline 
stations formed by the operators for the purpose of operating 
give-away programs. Camino! did not raise the price of 
gasoline to the dealers, but the dealers raised the price to the 
consumer by one cent per gallon and then remitted the extra 
one cent per gallon to Caminol to pay for the expenses and 
advertising of the give-away program. Tickets were dis-
tributed away from the station, to those who made no pur-
chases at the station, and to those who did. The tickets given 
to persons away from the stations had the stubs attached 
causing the recipients to go to the station to deposit them. 
The rules provided that any person 18 years of age, or over, 
would be given free, on request, an official numbered ticket 
for any drawing; that the giving of the ticket was uncon-
ditional and did not depend on the purchase of any merchan-
dise or services; that the winner did not have to be present 
at the drawing and that all winning numbers would be posted 
at the participating stations for a seven-day period. Draw-
ings were held twice a month and prizcs were distributed to 
those holding the winning tickets. 
[10] In People v. Carclas, 137 Cal.App.Supp. 788, 790, 
791 [28 P.2d 99], it was held that" An analysis of the section 
[Pen. Code, § 319] and an examination of the authorities 
construing it and other similar statutory provisions disclose 
that there are three elements necessary to constitute a lottery. 
These elements are: (1) The disposition of property, (2) upon 
a contingency determined by chance, (3) to a person who has 
854 CAL. GAs. RETAILERS v. REGAL PETROLEUM CoRP. [50 C.2d 
paid a valuable consideration for the chance of winning the 
prize, that is to say, one who has hazarded something of value 
upon the chance. (People v. Hecht, 119 Cal.App.Supp. 778 
[3 P.2d 399]; 17 R.C.L. 1222; 38 C.J. 289.)" (Emphasis 
added.) In the Card as case the defendant was a motion pic-
ture theater operator. He advertised by means of programs, 
newspapers, placards and on tbe theater screen that on a 
certain date two fully paid round trip tickets to Santa Cata-
lina Island would be given free to the holders of the lucky 
tickets which were to be drawn on a certain evening. The 
court stated the facts as follows: "The tickets were placed in 
the hands of the public by the distribution in the vicinity of 
the theater of five thousand theater programs, each containing 
one of the tickets, and by handing two thousand tickets to 
passing motorists. Also, an employee of the theater was 
stationed between the street and the entrance to the theater, 
who gave prize tickets to all who asked them, and offered 
them to any person who approached within proximity of her. 
No charge was made for any of these prize tickets, nor was it 
necessary that an admission ticket to the theater be pur-
chased.'' The winner was announced both inside and outside 
the theater; stubs were deposited in a receptacle outside the 
theater. The court noted that stubs were deposited there by 
persons who purchased admission tickets, by those who were 
admitted to the theater free of charge, and by others who did 
not attend the show. 
In the Cardas case, as in the one under consideration, 
''Counsel for the People argue that patronage from the ticket 
holders as a whole constituted consideration for the distribu-
tion of the prize even though the individual holders of tickets 
had not parted with consideration for the individual ticket 
held by them. This argument apparently proceeds upon the 
theory that the element of consideration is established by 
showing that the defendant received something of value in 
return for the distribution of the prizes. The question of 
consideration is not to be determined from the standpoint 
of the defendant, but from that of the holders of the prize 
tickets. The question is : Did the holders of prize tickets pay 
a valuable consideration for the chance? Certainly those who 
received prize tickets without buying an admission ticket did 
not pay anything for the chance of getting the prize. They 
did not hazard anything of value. It would then seem to 
follow that those who purchased admission tickets and received 
prize tickets, not at the box office but from another employee, 
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could not be said to have paid a consideration for the prize 
tickets since they could have received them free." 
In People v. Carpenter, 141 Cal.App.2d 884, 887, 888, 889, 
890 [297 P.2d 498] (hearing denied), a bank night drawing 
was also involved. As an advertising technique to encourage 
theater patronage, the operators of J_jakewood theater solicited 
registrations from house to house and gave registration blanks 
to people attending the theater who were asked if they would 
like to register for the bank night. Registration blanks were 
kept at the snack bar and sometimes at the box office and were 
given to anyone who asked for them. A ticket containing 
each number was put into a drum kept by the theater as the 
name to which it was assigned was placed in the registration 
book. Once a name was registered that person was eligible 
to win at any bank night held thereafter. Bank nights were 
held once a week and a ticket was drawn from the drum 
and given to the manager who compared it with the registra-
tion book. The winning name was then announced over loud-
speakers within and outside the theater and the person win-
ning was given two minutes to reach the stage and identify 
himself. Admission tickets were not necessary for persons 
wishing to enter the theater to see and hear the bank night 
drawing, or to go into the theater to claim the prize. 
In the Carpenter case the court held that the element of 
chance was lacking inm;much as under the facts of that case 
Carpenter, who arranged to have himself chosen as the one 
to draw the ticket, had palmed a ticket which he purported to 
draw from the drum on the stage. This was done according 
to a prearranged plan with two others. The court stated 
the "initial question" to be "Was the bank night drawing 
a lottery~" And after holding that the element of chance 
was missing due to the fraud of Carpenter, continued: "We 
come now to the third element in a lottery, viz: consideration 
for the chance of winning the prize. The question of consid-
eration is not to be determined from the standpoint of the 
defendant, but from that of the holders of prize tickets. The 
question is: Did the holders of prize tickets pay a valuable 
consideration for the chance? Certainly those who received 
prize tickets without buying an admission ticket did not pay 
anything for the chance of getting the prize. They did not 
hazard anything of value. It would then seem to follow that 
those who purchased admission tickets and received prize 
tickets, not at the box office but from another employee, could 
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a consideration for the tickets 
since could have received them free. 
"The court in the Cardas case, supra, relied Cross v. 
People, 18 Colo. 321 P. 821, 36 Am.St.Rep. 292]. In 
discussing the element of consideration in a lottery, the Colo-
rado Supreme Court stated: 'By the admitted facts it is 
shown that the plaintiffs in error gave business cards which 
entitled the holders to a chance on a piano, to be distributed 
as the holders of such chances elect. These tickets or 
chances were given indiscriminately to persons, whether they 
purchased of plaintiffs in error or to those who 
registered their names at their shoe store, and to those who, 
from a distance, sent the return postage. 'While it is admitted 
that Charles Linton purchased goods to the amount of one 
dollar at their store, and received one of these cards, it is 
admitted that such purchase, or any purchase of goods, was 
not a condition upon which the card was delivered. The fact 
that such cards or chances were given away to induce persons 
to visit their store with the expectation that they might pur-
chase goods, and thereby increase their trade, is a benefit too 
remote to constitute a consideration for the chances. Persons 
holding these cards, although not present, were, equally with 
those visiting their store, entitled to draw the prize. The 
element of gambling that is necessary to constitute this a 
lottery within the purview of the statute, to wit, the paying 
of money, directly or indirectly, for the chance of drawing the 
piano, is lacking, and the transaction did not constitute a 
violation of the statute.' " In holding that the element of 
consideration was also lacking the court had this to say: 
"Certainly those who registered upon request of a solicitor 
without attending the theater did not pay for the chance of 
getting the prize; neither did those who later registered with-
out purchasing an admission ticket. Those who purchased 
admission tickets and then registered while they were at 
the theater as patrons, cannot be said to have paid a consid-
eration for the privilege of registering, as they could have 
done so without buying an admission ticket. Once a person's 
name was registered, it might be drawn at any bank night 
thereafter, and it was not necessary that he purchase an ad-
mission ticket either to listen to or see the bank night drawing 
or to claim the award if his name was called. 
"It ther:fore follows, under the principles of the Cardas 
case, supra, that no consideration was paid for the chance of 
winning the bank night prize in the instant case." 
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In the case at bar all three groups of defendants engaged 
in the so-called give-away programs as an advertising scheme 
and to bring new patronage to their service station. In all 
groups, prize tickets were given away free to anyone who asked 
for them, and to many who did not ask for them; in all groups 
the tickets were given to persons away from the stations; in 
all groups the receipt of the ticket or tickets was not depend-
ent upon a purchase of merchandise or service and in all 
groups the prize winning tickets were honored regardless of a 
purchase of merchandise. The Norwalk and Beacon Groups 
raised the price of gasoline one cent per gallon to the con-
sumer in order to finance the advertising program. However, 
in both of these groups tickets were given away free without 
respect to the purchase of any gasoline or other related 
products. 
[11] The People, as amicus curiae, make the following 
point: It is contended that there are two types of advertising 
schemes-" closed participation" and "flexible participa-
tion.'' A closed participation scheme is where those participat-
ing in the scheme have paid a consideration for a chance to 
win the prize; the flexible participation type is where some 
have paid a consideration and some have not. As in the case 
at bar, there were some customers of the gasoline stations 
who received prize tickets after purchase of the products 
offered for sale. and others who received the tickets at their 
homes, or at other places, and paid for no merchandise. In 
this latter connection, the argument is made that in all of the 
groups the major part of the tickets went to those who made 
purchases. It is pointed out that in People v. Gonzales, 62 
Cal.App.2d 274, 278, 279, 285, 286 [144 P.2d 605), the 
theater manager testified that one cash night prize ticket was 
given to each patron who purchased a ticket when he pur-
chased the ticket and another was given to him as he left the 
theater. No tickets were distributed to persons who had not 
purchased admission tickets. The court noted that ''There 
was no general or indiscriminate distribution of the drawing 
tickets to persons irrespective of whether they paid admis-
sion." The court, after discussing the Cardas case, supra 
(137 Cal.App.Supp. 788), stated: "The decision in the 
Cardas case was a proper determination upon the facts therein 
that the drawing therein was not a lottery. That decision, 
however, is not determinative or at all persuasive that the 
drawing herein, involving facts vastly different from those 
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therein, was not a lottery. The presence of certain facts in 
that case, as to free distribution, and as to announcements 
and participation outside the theater, was the basis for the 
decision therein that the drawing was not a lottery, but in 
this case those or similar facts are not present and an opposite 
state of facts exists.'' From the court's statement that 
''There was no general or indiscriminate distribution of the 
drawing tickets to persons irrespective of whether they paid 
admission" (emphasis added) the People argue that because 
a lesser number of tickets in the case at bar were given to 
persons away from the station and to those who made no 
purchases that this was more like a closed participation scheme, 
and hence a lottery, than it was the flexible participation 
scheme which was found not to constitute a lottery in the 
Cardas case. 
[12] Since it clearly appears from the record that any 
person could have received a ticket, or tickets, free for the 
asking, or even without a request and without any necessity 
of making any kind of purchase it would seem that the relative 
numbers of tickets distributed with purchases or without 
purchases should not be determinative of the issue involved 
which is whether the holder, or holders, of the tickets paid, 
or promised to pay a valuable consideration for the chance of 
winning a prize. As the court stated in the Carpenter case, 
supra (141 Cal.App.2d 884, 888): "It would then seem to 
follow that those who purchased admission tickets and re-
ceived prize tickets, not at the box office but from another 
employee, could not be said to have paid a consideration for 
the prize tickets since they could have received them free.'' 
Also, in the Carpenter case (p. 889), the court, quoting from 
Cross v. People, 18 Colo. 321 [32 P. 821, 36 Am.St.Rep. 292], 
stated that '' '. . . The element of gambling that is necessary 
to constitute this a lottery within the purview of the statute, 
to wit, the paying of money, directly or indirectly, for the 
chance of drawing the piano, is lacking, and the transaction 
did not constitute a violation of the statute.' '' 
Plaintiffs and amicus curiae both argue that People v. Gon-
zales, 62 Cal.App.2d 274 [144 P.2d 605], laid down the rule 
that a closed participation program and thus a lottery exists 
where the distribution of tickets to persons other than cus-
tomers is not ''substantial'' or is ''negligible'' in comparison 
with those distributed to customers. This rule, it is con-
tended, has "emasculated" the holding of People v. Cardas, 
137 Cal.App.Supp. 788 [28 P.2d 99]. In view of the holding 
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in People v. Carpenter, 141 Cal.App.2d 884, 889, 890 [297 
P.2d 498], that "Certainly those who registered upon request 
of a solicitor without attending the theater did not pay for 
the chance of getting the prize; neither did those who later 
registered without purchasing an admission ticket. Those 
who purchased admission tickets and then registered while 
they were at the theater as patrons, caunot be said to have 
paid a consideration for the privilege of registering, as they 
could have done so without buying an admission ticket,'' it 
would appear that this argument is without merit. If any 
person could receive a ticket or tickets without paying any-
thing therefor, it would appear that the question of considera-
tion should not rest on the percentage of those receiving 
tickets with purchases as opposed to those receiving tickets 
without such purchases. 
Reliance is also placed on Holmes v. Saunders, 114 Cal.App. 
2d 389, 390, 391 [250 P.2d 269], where tickets for a drawing 
where an automobile was the prize, were distributed to all 
those who paid $1.00 for a six months' subscription to the 
"Associated Bulletin." It was there said : "The considera-
tion to make such a transaction a lottery need not be paid 
exclusively for the chance to win the prize. It is sufficient 
that the consideration, as here, be paid for something else and 
the chance to win the prize. (People v. Gonzales, 62 Cal.App.2d 
274 [144 P.2d 605] ; People v. Miller, 271 N.Y. 44 [2 N.E.2d 
38] ; and see the many cases collected in the notes in 48 
A.L.R. 1115; 57 A.L.R. 424; 103 A.I,.R. 866; 109 A.L.R. 709; 
113 A.L.R. 1121.) It is said in 34 American Jurisprudence 
650 'that no sooner is the term "lottery" defined by a court, 
than ingenuity evolves some scheme within the mischief dis-
cussed, although not quite within the letter of the definition 
given; but an examination of the many cases on the subject 
will show that it is very difficult, if not impossible, for the 
most ingenious and subtle mind to devise any scheme or plan, 
short of a gratuitous distribution of property, which has not 
been held by the courts of this country to be in violation of 
the lottery laws. . . . The court will inquire, not into the 
name, but into the game, however skillfully disguised, in 
order to ascertain if it is prohibited .... ' '' 
Several cases from other states are cited by the People in 
an endeavor to show that the promotional scheme here in-
volved did constitute a lottery. One somewhat factually 
similar is Featherstone v. Independent Service Stations Assn., 
(Tex. Civ. App.) 10 S.W.2d 124, 125, 126, 127, where a prize 
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ticket was distributed for each $1.00 spent by a customer of 
a service station. Apparently the plan was changed and 
some tickets were distributed to persons who did not make pur-
chases of merchandise or service. The 'l'exas court noted that 
a lottery was not defined by the laws of Texas and adopted 
the definition set forth in State v. L1'pkin, 169 N.C. 265 [84 
S.E. 340, 342, L.R.A. 1915F 1018, Ann.Cas. 1917D 137] : 
"A lottery, for all practical purposes may be defined as any 
scheme for the distribution of prizes, by lot or chance, by which 
one, on paying money or giving any other thing of value to 
another, obtains a token, which entitles him to receive a 
larger or smaller value or nothing, as some formula of chance 
may determine.'' The court said: ''While dealers, under the 
new plan, distributed tickets to noncustomers as well as to 
customers, it seems that the scheme was to distribute tickets, 
in the main to customers, as the evidence discloses that only 
a few, negligible in number, were given to persons other 
than customers. That the giving of tickets, and the drawings 
and distribution of prizes, were inducements to patronage 
and unquestionably lured customers, is shown from the very 
satisfactory business results that followed. Patronage thus 
induced was the consideration that passed from the ticket 
holder for the chance received, in that the price paid, what-
ever it was, the amount being immaterial, constituted the ag-
gregate price for the merchandise or service and the ticket 
that represented a chance to win the prize; in other words, 
for one undivided price both were purchased, the merchan-
dise, or service, and ticket, the ticket being as much bought 
as though priced separately." (Emphasis added.) In other 
words, the court held that the benefit flowing to the sponsor of 
the scheme was the consideration which made the scheme a 
lottery. [13] The Cardas case, su.pra, held that "The ques-
tion of consideration is not to be determined from the stand-
point of the defendant, but from that of the holders of the 
prize tickets'' and section 319 very clearly so states: That 
it is the distribution of property by chance ''among persons 
who have paid or promised to pay any valuable consideration 
for the chance of obtaining such property or a portion of it." 
The People also cite Federal Commttnications Com. v. 
American Broadcasting Co., 347 U.S. 284, 293, 294 [74 S.Ct. 
593, 98 L.Ed. 699], where radio give-away programs were 
involved. The statute there involved (18 U.S.C. § 1304) pro-
vided: "Whoever broadcasts by means of any radio station 
for which a license is required by any law of the United 
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States, or whoever, operating any such station, knowingly 
permits the broadcasting, of, any advertisement of or infor-
mation concerning any lottery, gift enterprise, or similar 
scheme, offering prizes dependent in whole or in part upon 
lot or chance, or any list of the prizes drawn or awarded by 
means of any such lottery, gift enterprise, or scheme, whether 
said list contains any part or all of such prizes, shall be 
fined .... " Examples of the give-away programs were listed 
as "Stop the Music," "What's My Name" and "Sing it 
Again." The court, speaking through Mr. Chief Justice 
Warren, stated that the Federal Communications Commission 
"contends that consideration in the form of money or a thing 
of value is not essential, and that a commercial benefit to the 
promoter satisfies the consideration requirement ... " and 
that the section involved did not define the type of consider-
ation necessary. The court held : "We find no decisions 
precisely in point on the facts of the cases before us. The 
courts have defined consideration in various ways, but so far 
as we are aware none has ever held that a contestant's listen-
ing at home to a radio or television program satisfies the con-
sideration requirement. Some courts-with vigorous protest 
from others-have held that the requirement is satisfied by a 
'raffle' scheme giving free chances to persons who go to a 
store to register in order to participate in the drawing of a 
prize, and similarly by a 'bank night' scheme giving free 
chances to persons who gather in front of a motion picture 
theater in order to participate in a drawing held for the 
primary benefit of the said patrons of the theatre. But such 
cases differ substantially from the cases before us. To be 
eligible for a prize on the 'give-away' programs involved here, 
not a single home contestant is required to purchase anything 
or pay an admission price or leave his home to visit the pro-
moter's place of business; the only effort required for partici-
pation is listening." (Emphasis added.) The People rely 
on the italicized portion of the above-quoted statement as 
a holding that when a participant is required to go to the 
sponsor's place of business to deposit his prize ticket stub the 
necessary consideration is established. The Supreme Court 
also noted that "\Ve believe that it would be stretching the 
statute to the breaking point to give it an interpretation that 
would make such programs a crime.'' [14] In view of our 
statute (Pen. Code, § 319) defining a lottery and which pro-
vides that the consideration necessary is a "valuable one" 
paid, or promised to be paid by the one receiving the ticket, 
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the fact that a ticket holder must go to the place of business 
of the sponsor of the scheme to deposit the ticket stub cannot 
be considered the necessary consideration. 
We are also urged by the People to consider section 1605 
of the Civil Code in defining the consideration necessary 
under the lottery statutes. That section provides that ''Any 
benefit conferred, or agreed to be conferred, upon the promi-
sor, by any other person, to which the promisor is not lawfully 
entitled, or any prejudice suffered, or agreed to be suffered, 
by such person, other than such as he is at the time of consent 
lawfully bound to suffer, as an inducement to the promisor, is 
a good consideration for a promise." It would again appear 
that, in view of the plain provisions of section 319 of the Penal 
Code, in order to constitute consideration within the definition 
of a lottery there must be a valuable consideration paid, or 
promised to be paid by the ticket holder. (People v. Carpen-
ter, 141 Cal.App.2d 884 [297 P.2d 498].) [15] We held in 
De Mille v. American Fed. of Radio Artists, 31 Cal.2d 139, 156 
[187 P.2d 769, 175 A.L.R. 382], that "Penal statutes will not 
be given application beyond their plain intent. Such acts 
include only those offenses coming clearly within the import 
of the language.'' [16] The ''realistic approach'' to the 
c<msideration necessary to constitute a promotion scheme a 
lottery which is urged upon us by the People in asking us to 
accept the definition of consideration as found in section 1605 
of the Civil Code would seem to be an argument which should 
be directed to the Legislature rather than to this court. 
[17] It is our conclusion that defendants' advertising and 
promotional scheme did not fall within the definition of a 
lottery as set forth in section 319 of the Penal Code because 
of the lack of consideration. 
The portions of the judgment appealed from are reversed. 
Gibson, C. J., Shenk, J., Traynor, J., Schauer, J., Spence, 
J., and McComb, J., concurred. 
